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Abstract. The analysis of long-term social and political developments in Western countries is 
often difficult because of a lack of sufficient survey data. Almost always official election and 
census tatistics are available over long periods, yet the use of these data for individual-level 
inferences runs the risk of the 'ecological fallacy'. In this paper we propose a method to go 
beyond the fallacy, the Duncan-Davis technique for area-classified data. The method is dis- 
cussed and used to assess the amount of religious voting among Dutch Catholics in the 1971 
general election. While the technique is only moderately helpful in this case, it is expected to 
be far more useful for the analysis of older elections. 
I. Introduction 
The empirical study of long-term political and social developments in Euro- 
pean countries is often hindered by a lack of sufficient survey data. For 
example, in the Netherlands only from 1971 onwards national election sur- 
veys have been systematically held by inter-university research teams; before 
1971 no more than three scattered surveys have been undertaken, all of 
which the original data have been lost. 
One likely alternative source of data are the official election statistics, 
which in the Netherlands have been collected for every election since 1918 by 
the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS); in addition ational population 
census have been held by the same bureau in 1947, 1960 and 1971. Both 
counts provide a wealth of data, be it aggregated at the municipal level. 
Obviously these data may be extremely useful, even indispensable for any 
longitudinal analysis of socio-political developments. However, since we 
often are interested in individual-level behavior, we must tackle a problem 
of aggregate data known as the 'ecological fallacy'. 
The danger of ecological fallacy occurs in the case of ecological inference, 
in which aggregate l vel data are used to estimate individual behavior. The 
fallacy was first recognized by Robinson (1950), who demonstrated that 
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correlations between literacy rate and place of birth or skin color found at 
the state level were reversed when examined at the individual evel. Since 
then ecological inference has been practically equated with ecological fallacy, 
and consequently analyses of aggregate data have been relatively rare. 
Given the dependence on aggregate data for longitudinal research, two 
techniques may be employed to avoid fallacious ecological inferences. The 
first is the use of ecological regression instead of ecological correlations 
(Goodman, 1953, 1959; Blalock, 1961; see also Przeworski & Teune, 1970). 
This technique, however, requires complex assumptions about the relation- 
ships between an individual's cores on dependent and independent variables 
and the grouping of individuals into aggregate units, assumptions which are 
difficult to ascertain in empirical practice (Shively, 1969). More recently 
ecological regression has also been criticized on mathematical grounds 
(Schmidt, 1984; Thomsen, 1987). 
A second technique is the use of area-classified data for individual-level 
inferences, developed by Duncan & Davis (1953; see also Shively, 1969). 
Put shortly, the method involves the addition of individual relationships of 
maximal and minimal strength in areal subunits with the objective of setting 
absolute boundaries around the real value of the individual-level relationship. 
It has the advantage over ecological regression that it requires no postulates 
and works with real values instead of estimates. 
In this article we will discuss the Duncan-Davis technique (hereafter 
abbreviated as D-D)  and apply it to Dutch aggregate lection data. As a 
vehicle for its demonstration the relationship between adherence to the 
Catholic religion and voting for the Dutch Catholic party (KVP) will serve, 
expressed in a socaUed political orthodoxy index (p.o.-index), the "per- 
centage of enfranchised members of [the Catholic] group supporting that 
group's political party" (Andeweg, 1982: 48). The first goal of this article is 
to establish the value of the Catholic p.o.-index with the help of the D-D 
technique for the national elections of 1971. The second goal is to evaluate 
the usefulness of D-D for longitudinal research purposes in general. 
This article will proceed as follows. In Section II we will describe in more 
detail the D-D technique and the data to be used. In Section III the empirical 
results will be presented, while Section IV is reserved for conclusions. 
II. Method and data 
The application of the D-D technique is only possible in the form of 2 x 2 
contingency tables, like Table 1. The problem of ecological inference can be 
described as the estimation of one missing cell entry, given the knowledge 
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Table 1. Religion and party choice 
Roman Catholic Other eligion 
Catholic party N1 
Other party N2 
NI NII N 
of the values of marginals N1, N2, NI, and NII. Duncan & Davis proposed 
a calculation technique in which "the individual correlation is approximated 
by the least maximum and the greatest minimum among the results for 
several systems of areal subdivision" (1953: 666). 
For every subunit hose maximum and minimum strengths of an individual- 
level relationship are calculated which are consistent with that subunit's 
aggregate marginals; this procedure creates absolute numerical limits be- 
tween which the real value of the relationship necessarily must lie. Under 
the condition of uneven distribution, adding up the minima and maxima of 
the subunits to a higher aggregate l vel results in narrowing the limits be- 
tween which the individual relationship may be found. 
An example will clarify the method. Imagine a country in which the 
marginals of Table 1 acquire the following values (in absolute numbers): 
N1 
N2 
NI 
NII 
N 
N1/NI 
(Catholic party vote) 30 
(vote for other parties & non-vote) 70 
(number of enfranchised Catholics) 50 
(number of enfranchised non-Catholics) 50 
(number of enfranchised inhabitants) 100 
(Catholic p.o.-index) 
If we infer an individual-level p.o.-index from these marginals, we see that 
its value lies between 60.0 and zero, as Tables 2a and 2b show. 
Now suppose this country consists of two districts, A and B, in which the 
marginals are distributed as follows: 
District A District B 
N1 25 5 
N2 25 45 
NI 40 10 
NII 10 40 
Tables 3a-d show the maximal and minimal relationships in both districts. 
Adding the maxima nd minima of the districts up to the national level yields 
Tables 4a and 4b. We see that the range of possible values of the indvidual- 
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Table 2a. Maximum relationship religion and voting 
Catholic religi0n Other religion Total 
Catholic party 30 - 30 
Other party 20 50 70 
Total 50 50 100 
P.o.-index = 60.0. 
Table 2b. Minimum relationship religion and voting 
Catholic religion Other religion Total 
Catholic party - 30 30 
Other party 50 20 70 
Total 50 50 100 
P.o.-index = 0.0. 
level p.o.-index has been halved, simply by disaggregating the national unit 
in two subunits. A further breakdown into more subunits would yield still 
narrower limits. 
The success of D-D is dependent upon the distribution of variables among 
the disaggregate subunits. If variables are evenly spread among the subunits, 
disaggregation will not help us in limiting the value range of the individual 
relationship. If, on the other hand, variables are not uniformly distributed 
over the subunits, then application of the D-D technique will lead to nar- 
rower limits for both the subunits and the aggregate l vel, as Tables 2, 3 and 
4 show. The more homogeneous on a variable a given subunit is, the closer 
maximum and minimum values will approach one another. 
The data for our analysis tem from two CBS counts in 1971, the official 
election statistics (CBS, 1972) and the national population census (CBS, 
1982). The election statistics were collected on the basis of municipal voter 
registration and ballot counting, and presented at the municipal level. Data 
on religious affiliation were collected for every Dutch municipality during 
the census. 
The Catholic p.o.-index isoperationalized bydividing the number of Cath- 
olic votes by the share of Catholics in the total eligible electorate (NI/NI in 
Table 1). Although traditionally there were differences inbirth rates between 
the different denominations in the Netherlands, leading to differences in 
electoral and popular proportional shares, these differences had lost much 
of their sharpness in 1971. Bakvis (1981) used a correction factor of 0.982 
to estimate the right proportion of voting-age Catholics in 1971 as compared 
to the total Catholic share of the Dutch population; we assume that the 
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Table 3a. District A, maximum 
Catholic religion Other religion Total 
Catholic party 25 - 25 
Other party 15 10 25 
Total 40 10 50 
P.o.-index = 62.5. 
Table 3b. District A, minimum 
Catholic religion Other religion Total 
Catholic party 15 10 25 
Other party 25 - 25 
Total 40 10 50 
P.o.-index = 37.5. 
Table 3c. District B, maximum 
Catholic religion Other religion Total 
Catholic party 5 - 5 
Other party 5 40 45 
Total 10 40 50 
P.o.-index = 50.0. 
Table 3d. District B, minimum 
Catholic religion Other religion Total 
Catholic party - 5 5 
Other party 10 35 45 
Total 10 40 50 
50 P.o.-index = 0.0. 
number  of  en f ranch ised  Catho l ics  is p ropor t iona l  to the i r  share of  the  tota l  
popu la t ion .  
III. Results 
In o rder  to assess the  appl icabi l i ty  of  D -D  to the Dutch  soc io-pol i t ica l  
s i tuat ion we have  determined  the degree  o f  homogene i ty  for  the two sub- 
levels  o f  aggregat ion  that  we cons ider  here ,  i .e. p rov inces  and munic ipa l i t ies .  
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Table 4a. Country, maximum 
Catholic religion Other religion Total 
Catholic party 30 - 30 
Other party 20 50 70 
Total 50 50 100 
P.o.-index = 60.0. 
Table 4b. Country, minimum 
Catholic religion Other religion Total 
Catholic party 15 15 30 
Other party 35 35 70 
Total 50 50 100 
P.o.-index = 30.0. 
Table 5. Homogeneity of provinces and municipalities, 1971 
Provinces (%) Municipalities (%) 
Homogeneous Catholic 1 (9) 207 (24) 
Homogeneous non-Catholic 2 (18) 264 (30) 
Heterogeneous 8 (73) 402 (46) 
Total 11 (100) 873 (100) 
A sublevel is considered homogeneous Catholic when more than 90 percent 
of its population adheres to the Catholic religion. A sublevel is regarded as 
homogeneously non-Catholic when less than 10 percent of its population is 
Catholic. The results can be glanced from Table 5. At first sight especially 
at the municipal level the distribution of Catholics and non-Catholics eems 
to be uneven enough to make a D-D analysis useful. 
For the Netherlands as a whole the marginals of Table 1 have the following 
values in 1971: 
N1 (vote for Catholic party, KVP) 1,380,392 
N2 (vote for non-Catholic parties & non-vote) 6,666,577 
NI (number of enfranchised Catholics) 3,181,293 
Nil (number of enfranchised non-Catholics) 4,865,676 
N (total number of enfranchised inhabitants) 8,046,969 
From Tables 6a and 6b it can be seen that the Catholic p.o.-index, measured 
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Catholic religion Other religion Total 
Catholic party 1,380,392 - 1,380,392 
Other pt. & non-vote 1,800,901 4,865,676 6,666,577 
Total 3,181,293 4,865,676 8,046,969 
P.o.-index = 43.4. 
Table 6b. The Netherlands, minimum, 1971 
Catholic religion Other religion Total 
Catholic party - 1,380,392 1,380,392 
Other pt. & non-vote 3,181,293 3,485,284 6,666,577 
Total 3,181,293 4,865,676 8,046,969 
P.o.-index = 0.0. 
Table 7. The Netherlands, minimum, by provinces, 1971 
Catholic religion Other religion Total 
Catholic party 425,593 954,799 1,380,392 
Other pt. & non-vote 2,755,700 3,910,877 6,666,577 
Total 3,181,293 4,865,676 8,040,969 
P.o.-index = 13.4. 
at the national level, must lie between 43.4 and 0.0. Disaggregation of the 
national totals to the level of the provinces and the addition of provincial 
minima and maxima in the way described in Section I I  gives us an identical 
maximum score, and a moderately higher minimum score of 13.4. Since the 
aggregated maximum score, following the definition of the p.o.-index as 
N1/NI (from which follows that N1 < NI), will be the same no matter from 
how many subunits it is calculated, Table 7 only displays the minimum 
limits. Given the low numbers of homogeneous Catholic and non-Catholic 
provinces, the moderate size of the increase of the minimum score could be 
expected: the less homogeneous the subunits, the more even a variable is 
spread among them, the less the minimum value will approach the maximum 
value. 
We might expect hat an identical disaggregation to the level of municipali- 
ties and addition of their maximal and minimal scores would give a much 
higher p.o.-index, given the higher degree of homogeneity within the munici- 
palities. This is not the case. The D-D procedure yields a minimum score 
of 17.5, only slightly more than the provincial one (Table 8). Since we 
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Table 8. The Netherlands, minimum, by municipalities, 1971 
Catholic religion Other religion Total 
Catholic party 555,651 823,741 1,380,392 
Other pt. & non-vote 2,625,642 4,040,935 6,666,577 
Total 3,181,293 4,865,676 8,040,969 
P.o.-index = 17.5. 
Table 9. Catholic p.o.-index, minimal and maximal values by three levels of aggregation 
Level Maximal Minimal Difference 
National 43.4 0.0 43.4 
Provincial 43.4 13.4 30.0 
Municipal 43.4 17.5 25.9 
cannot reach beneath the municipal evel on the basis of the CBS data, the 
conclusion is that the percentage of enfranchised Catholics voting for the 
Catholic party in 1971 lies between a minimal value of 17.5 and a maximum 
of 43.4. Table 9 summarizes the different scores for the different levels. 
IV. Conclusions 
How useful has the application of the D-D technique been for the calculation 
of p.o.-indices? As Table 9 shows, the application of the D-D technique 
resulted in a substantial limiting of possible values of the Catholic p.o.-index. 
At the same time, however, the difference left is still too large to permit 
firm conclusions about the relationship between religion and party choice in 
1971. At first sight the D-D method has not been of tremendous help. 
One reason for its limited utility is based on a particular property of the 
minimum p.o.-index as calculated in this paper. Recalling the notations of 
marginals in Table 1, it can be seen that a minimum p.o.-index may be zero 
in three cases. The first cases occur when a subunit is totally non-Catholic 
(NI = 0) or when it contains no Catholic party voters (N1 = 0), cases also 
mentioned by Duncan & Davis. The third case exists when the number of 
voters for the Catholic party is smaller than the number of enfranchised non- 
Catholics (N1 < Nil) ,  a property inherent in the 2 x 2 calculation of the 
p.o.-index. Since by definition in the index the number of Catholic party 
voters is smaller than the number of enfranchised Catholics (N1 < NI), it 
follows that for all subunits containing enfranchised Catholics, the minimum 
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p.o.-index exceeds zero only when the number of Catholic party voters 
exceeds the number of enfranchised non-Catholics (N1 >NII ,  or put differ- 
ently, N1 > N - NI). Tables 3b and 3d provide examples of the two situ- 
ations, Table 3b for when N1 > NII and Table 3d for when N1 < NII. 
This property of the subunits' minimum p.o.-scores affects the number of 
subunits that contribute to the minimum p.o.-score of the unit as a whole. 
If we assume that for 1971 the minimum p.o.-index is 43.4 or less, it follows 
that in order for N1 >NII ,  NI must at least be 70 percent of N in every 
subunit. In concrete terms this means that in our research only two out of 
eleven provinces and 304 out of 873 municipalities have yielded a minimum 
score greater than zero, and thus have contributed to the national minimum 
p.o.-indices of respectively 13.4 and 17.5. Since in general municipalities 
with such large numbers of religious adherents are predominantly small and 
rural (with exceptions mainly in the Southern part of the Netherlands) the 
minimum p.o.-index as calculated in this paper has included only a relatively 
small number of people. 
For the broader purpose of longitudinal research the use of the D-D 
technique is best reserved for the analysis of homogeneous subunits within 
a given unit (e.g., homogeneously Catholic, Protestant, or working class 
areas of a country). For example, an extension of the research presented 
here to the 1950s and 1940s would include a greater number of provinces 
and municipalities in the calculation of the national p.o.-indices, since in 
those days more people were religious and the religious parties received far 
more votes than in 1971. Thus, within the limits we have discussed, the 
application of the Duncan-Davis technique may make a fair contribution to 
the unravelling of the socio-political developments of the past and present. 
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